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"If the child was born in Mexico, ... alright, and mom's here illegally, 
alright there'd be no doubt in the court's mind. Then the child is here 
illegally and I'd have to grant the U.S. citizen plaintiff custody."! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
47 
The decisive role that immigration status frequently plays in family law matters is widely 
overlooked. A systemic review of family court decisions, however, reveals that judges and 
advocates are all too eager to attach exaggerated legal significance to immigration status with little 
explanation and no analysis. While immigrants are historically no strangers to family court, 
demographic changes in the composition of families and shifts in the nation's immigration laws 
suggest an increase in the frequency and complexity of immigration status issues confronted in 
family court.2 As decision makers and practitioners seek guidance in responding to the emergence 
of immigration status as an issue in family law,3 there is urgent need for thoughtful assessment and 
creative thinking on this neglected topic. 
Though they are in constant and critical contact, immigration law and family law form a 
peculiar and conflicted mix. There is no area of law in which the federal government's power is 
more robust than in immigration 4 and there is no area of law more fully reserved to the states than 
domestic relations.5 One result of this divide is that few practitioners and adjudicators develop 
1. Nunez v. Alonso, No. 04-D-311872-C (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dist. ct. Fam. Div. hearing Feb. 25, 2004) (recording on file 
with author). 
2. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New 
Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481, 1483 (2002) (discussing the impact of demographic changes on the increasing overlap 
between immigration law and civil rights law) [hereinafter End of Civil Rights]. 
3. Vicky Albert and David B. Thronson, Focus Group of Department of Human Resources Nevada Division of Child and 
Family Services Supervisors in Las Vegas, Nev. (June 29, 2004) (transcript on file with author); Interview with Thomas Leeds, 
Child Support/Paternity Hearing Master, Eighth District of Nevada Judicial Court, Family Division (Mar. 8, 2004); Interview 
with Frank Sullivan, Domestic Violence Conunissioner, Eighth District of Nevada Judicial Court, Family Division (Apr. 5, 
2004); Interview with Jane Femiano, Clark County Office of the Special Public Defender (Aug. 12, 2004); Interview with 
Veronica Tobar Thronson, Directing Attorney, Domestic Violence Unit, Clark County Legal Services (Jan. 23, 2004). 
4. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) ("[T]hat the formulation of ... policies [pertaining to the entry of 
noncitizens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the 
legislative andjudicia\ tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government."). See also Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 
753, 769-70 (1972) ("[P]lenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly 
established. "). 
5. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301,2309 (2004) ("One of the principal areas in which this 
Court has customarily declined to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed that '[tJhe whole subject of 
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United 
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expertise in the complexities of both areas. Decisions in one area frequently do not display a 
sophisticated understanding of decisions in the other. Moreover, family law and immigration law 
are motivated by divergent and often conflicting policies which are difficult, and on occasion 
impossible, to reconcile. 
This article considers the intersection of family law and immigration law from a perspective 
that has been, to a great extent, ignored. Given the express role of family relationships in 
determining the fate of immigration petitions,6 the impact of family law determinations on 
immigration outcomes is widely discussed and analyzed. Little scholarship, however, considers 
the reverse, i.e., the pronounced influence that a person's immigration status can have on a diverse 
range of family law detenninations including child protection, divorce, child custody, and child 
support.8 
Part II of this article identifies the confluence of demographic trends and immigration law 
that results in the creation of mixed status families. The rise in mixed status families is a strong 
force, generating an increase in the frequency and complexity of immigration status issues 
confronted in family court matters. 
Part III of this article surveys available family court opinions evidencing the impact of 
immigration status on family law. Drawing from this body of cases, the article develops a 
classification of the approaches that family courts adopt when presented with immigration status 
issues. Identifying and analyzing several key issues that arise from each classification serves to 
highlight flaws in current family court practices and suggest needed reforms. 
Part IV suggests an agenda for further research and guidelines for addressing immigration 
status issues in family court. This article is purposefully broad and exploratory. As a prelude to 
further study of a neglected area of inquiry, the article seeks to provide a framework to identify and 
highlight issues and areas that deserve further exploration and development. 
States."') (quoting Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (Brewer, J., dissenting»; see also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 
581,587 (1989) ("[D]omestic relations are preeminently matters of state law .... "); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) 
("Family relations are a traditional area of state concern."). 
6. MICHAEL F. FIX, WENDY ZIMMERMAN & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN INST., THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT 
FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immigjmegration.pdf (last 
visited June 1,2005) (stating that approximately eighty percent oflegal immigration is expressly based on family relationships). 
7. For insightful articles in this vein, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Family and Immigration: A Roadmap for the 
Ruritanian Lawmaker, 43 AM. 1. COMPo L. 511 (1995); Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REv. 943 
(2001). 
8. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1076 
(1994) ("[I]mmigration analysts have more often focused on matters of entry and exclusion than on the general status of aliens 
who are already present."); see also Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and Marriage? 
Immigration Law's Conflicted Answer, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 276 (2003) ("Much of the analysis of immigration law tends to 
focus on how immigration rules regulate and channel immigration of individuals, rather than on the impact they have on the 
migration of families and couples."). But see Peter Margulies, Children, Parents and Asylum, 15 GEO. lMMIGR. 1. REv. 289 
(2001) (seeking to synthesize family and refugee law by "distill[ing] values from asylum law and family law that will clarify the 
substance and process of decisions regarding children and asylum"). 
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II. "ILLEGAL" IMMIGRATION AND THE RISE OF MIXED STATUS FAMILIES 
An important characteristic of the immigrant population today is the increase in the number 
of "mixed status" families, that is families in which all family members do not share the same 
immigration status or citizenship. The creation and persistence of mixed status families is heavily 
impacted by a confluence of high immigration levels and harsh immigration laws. The resulting 
increase in the number of mixed status families contributes to the emerging prominence of 
immigration status issues in family court proceedings. 
A. Growth and Dispersal of the Immigrant Population 
Current levels of immigration are high, and annual immigration flows have tripled over the 
past generation.9 The share of the total U.S. population that is foreign born now stands at about ten 
percent, nearly double the level of 1970.10 This figure is higher in traditional receiving states, II but 
a remarkable aspect of the growth is the increased dispersal of the immigrant population to areas 
previously unaccustomed to immigration growth. 12 In fact, during the 1990s the immigrant 
population in "new immigrant states" grew twice as fast as the immigrant population in the six 
states that traditionally have been home to the largest numbers of immigrants. I 
Also striking is the importance of family to immigrant populations. Households headed by 
immigrants are significantly more likely to contain children. 14 Further, children of immigrants, for 
example, are more likely to live in a home with two parents than are children in entirely native 
families. 15 Unfortunately, "immigrants' cross-generational gains and economic integration are 
paralleled by an all-too-American pattern of immigrant family disintegration.,,16 The share of 
9. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 8. 
10. !d. at 9. While higher than it has been recently, this is significantly lower than the fifteen percent of the total U.S. 
population that was foreign born at the beginning of the last century. [d. 
11. One in five people in New York and one in four people in California are foreign bom Profile oj the Foreign.Born 
Population in the United States, 2000, (U.S. Census Bureau Dec. 2001) at 14, available at 
http://www.census.gov/prodl2002pubs/p23·206.pdf(last visited June 1, 2005). 
12. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 9; see also End oj Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 1493 (noting that 
"migration today affects the entire United States, not just anyone particular region"). 
13. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 9; see also End oj Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 1493·94 (describing 
diversification of immigration and its national impact). States newly experiencing high immigrant growth include North 
Carolina, Georgia, Nevada, Utah, Nebraska, and Tennessee. See generally, SYLVIA R. LAZOS AND STEPHEN C. JEANETIA, 
CAMBIO DE COLORES: IMMIGRATION OF LATINOS TO MISSOURI (University of Missouri-Columbia Extension 2002). 
14. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 14 (Fifty· five percent of immigrant families have children, compared 
with thirty-five percent of nonimmigrant families.). 
15. Press Release, The Urban Institute, Low Income Children of Immigrants More Likely to Live in Two-Parent Families 
(Nov. 26, 2002), available at 
http://www.urban.org/femplate.cfrn?Section=Research&NavMenuID= 141 &template=ffaggedContenWiewPublication.cfm&Pu 
blicationID=7993 (last visited June 1, 2005). 
16. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 20. 
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immigrant families that are divorced or separated doubles from first to second generation. 17 As 
more immigrants and immigrant families arrive at family courts, voluntarily or not, they bring 
immigration related issues with them. 
B. Immigration Laws and "Illegal" Immigration 
The growth and dispersal of the immigrant population is accompanied by a rise in the 
portion of the immigrant population that lacks legal immigration status. This is a result not only of 
increased immigration, but also of immigration laws that bar many immigrants from achieving legal 
status. This, in turn, contributes to the creation of mixed status immigrant families. 
Immigration laws "not only define who is a legal immigrant but also, by necessity, create 
the converse - the 'illegal' or undocumented [immigrant].,,18 The illegality of an immigrant is, 
therefore, entirely a social and legal construction, created by "a body of rules passed by Congress 
and reinforced by popular culture.,,19 The categorization of some immigrants as illegal "is neither 
inherent nor natural, but rather legal and political.,,2o Any discussion of the rise of the 
undocumented popUlation, therefore, must take into account expansions in the way that immigrants 
are placed or kept in a category characterized as illegal. 
Immigration laws and policies a century ago allowed relatively easy access to lawful 
immigration status. Thus while the share of the U.S. population that was foreign-born in the early 
1900s was much higher than it is today/l most foreign-born U.S. residents at that time either had 
legal immigration status or at least the prospect of attaining it. As discussed more fully below, the 
importance that is now attached to the "illegality" of a person's immigration status is a relatively 
new phenomenon. 
Estimates for the size of the undocumented population range from seven million22 to eleven 
million. 23 Notably, the undocumented population has risen not only in sheer numbers, but also as a 
17. Id. 
18. Lenni B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. INT'L 1. & COM. REG. 483. 484 (2002). 
19. Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the u.s. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal COlIStruction of Nonpersons, 28 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263. 268 (1997) [hereinafter Aliens and U.S. Immigration Laws); see also Margot Mendelson, The 
LegaJ Production of Identities: A Narrative Analysis of Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S LJ. 138,203 (2004) ("The concept of 'illegal alicn' or 'undocumented immigrant' is a legal categorization created and 
made meaningful by U.S. immigration laws."). 
20. Mendelson. supra note 19, at 203. 
21. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 9. 
22. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 (January 2003), available at 
hnp:lluscis.gov/graphics/sharedJaboutus/statisticslIll_ReporU211.pdf (last visited June I, 2005). It should be noted that 
counting the understandably wary undocumented population is not easy. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 18, at 484 ("[E)ven when 
people can be counted, accurately characterizing their legal status requires legal sophistication."). 
23. FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN iMMIGRATION REFORM (FAIR), How Many Illegal Aliens? (January 2002), available at 
http://www.fairus.orglImmigrationIssueCenterslImmigrationIssueCenters.cfm?ID= I I 83&c= 13 (last visited June I, 2005). 
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percentage of the foreign born population. In 1994, thirteen percent of the foreign-born population 
was undocumented and by 2000 this figure had risen to twenty-eight percent.24 The rapid rise in the 
percentage of foreign-born without legal immigration status greatly influenced by changes in 
immigration law making it more difficult for undocumented immigrants to cure the illegality of 
their immigration status. 
In contrast to the immigration laws of the past, more recent refonns not only label more 
immigrants "illegal," but also increasingly generate barriers that prevent undocumented immigrants 
from regularizing their immigration status. To give but one example, some immigrants who 
otherwise qualify for legal pennanent residence status are pennitted to "adjust" status, that is to 
process their applications in the United States rather than being forced to leave this country and file 
their application for a Visa at the United States embassy in their home country.25 The option to 
adjust, however, is prohibited for persons with certain present or past violations of immigration law 
such as unlawful presence, illegal entry, and unauthorized work.26 In 2001, Congress removed a 
provision of immigration law that had pennitted the government to overlook such violations and 
adjust status of persons who paid a $1,000 fme. 27 Without this penalty provision, any person who is 
barred from adjustment can only process an application for legal pennanent residence only outside 
the United States. 
Those who attempt to process abroad often run afoul of another immigration law provision. 
In 1996 Congress added a provision that bars the reentry of people who leave the United States after 
remaining here unlawfully for more than 180 days.28 Working in tandem, these provisions 
completely prevent otherwise eligible immigrants from obtaining legal permanent resident status: 
the laws bar adjustment of status within the United States and bar the reentry of applicants who 
leave. 
As a result of these provisions, undocumented immigrants routinely fmd themselves not 
only without means to regularize their immigration status, but also facing even more barriers if they 
leave. "Perversely, the statutory provisions meant to encourage compliance with the law may have 
encouraged the opposite: People wait in the United States hoping for a method of legalizing or 
adjusting status rather than leaving the United States and triggering the bar.,,29 Contrary to popular 
myth, current immigration law simply does not provide an avenue to legal immigration status for 
any person willing to wait long enough in some mythical line. 
Moreover, as heightened security concerns increase spending and effort to control U.S. 
borders, crossings have become more difficult and risky.30 Further, interior enforcement of 
24. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 12. 
25. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255(a) (2005). 
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (2005). 
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2005). 
28. 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2005). 
29. Benson, supra note 18, at 488. 
30. See Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Expanded Border Control Plans (Aug. 10, 
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immigration laws is not a high priority for the Department of Homeland Security, meaning that the 
risks of deportation after arrival are not as high as the risks of being caught crossing a border.3l 
This combination discourages past patterns of seasonal migration and results in a more permanent 
pattern of settlement for undocumented immigrants. 
In contrast to past generations in which many undocumented immigrants gradually moved 
into legal immigration status or maintained a less permanent presence in the United States, today's 
undocumented population is notable for both its lack of prospects for legalization under current law 
and its relative stability. This has profound implications for the increase in mixed status families. 
C. Mixed Status Families and Their Implications for Family Courts 
As the United States increasingly becomes home to a long-term undocumented population, 
it is not surprising that members of this population marry and have children, creating mixed-status 
immigrant households in which family members do not share the same immigration status or 
citizenship. The formation of family ties between undocumented immigrants and persons with legal 
immigration status in tum influences the decisions of undocumented immigrants to remain in this 
country. 
The inability of some immigrants to regularize their immigration status does not mean that 
their family members are similarly disabled. Despite the importance of family in immigration law, 
"immigrant families are not viewed as a unit, and individual family members are not equal.,,32 
Undocumented immigrants with no means of achieving legal immigration status often form families 
with persons who have different immigration histories or who already have legal immigration status 
or citizenship. Moreover, children born in the United States are U.S. citizens at birth, regardless of 
the status oftheir parents.33 
Given the difficulties in changing status discussed above, many families that in the past 
eventually would be composed of citizens now have family members who remain without legal 
immigration status and without prospects of attaining it. As a result, it is exceedingly common that 
family members do not share a single immigration status. Indeed, of families with children and 
headed by a noncitizen, eighty-five percent are mixed-status families?4 Even more striking, looking 
at the entire population of the United States, one of every ten children lives in a mixed-status 
2004}, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3930 (last visited June 1,2005). 
31. H.G. Reza, Border Patrol Faces New Limits in Inland Empire, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at BI (reporting that 
"[ dJocuments and interviews show that Department of Homeland Security officials want to concentrate Border Patrol agents at 
the borders and limit their inland activity to arresting illegal immigrants while they are traveling from the border and at 
transportation centers such as Los Angeles International Airport and highway checkpoints such as those at Temecula and San 
Clemente"). 
32. David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? ReconSidering Conceptions a/Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 
63 Dmo ST. L.J. 979, 993 (2002). 
33. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §I (All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens ofthe United States and of the State wherein they reside.) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1401(a) (2004)). 
34. FIX, ZIMMERMAN & PASSEL, supra note 6, at 15. 
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family.35 Of poor children, fifteen percent live in mixed-status families. 36 
These figures demonstrate how many families are directly touched by immigration laws and 
issues related to immigration status. While the immigration issues that affect some families may be 
slight, for many families immigration status will have a major impact. With immigration playing a 
prominent role in the lives of so many families and children, it is not surprising that immigration 
status issues are raised more frequently in family courts. 
Moreover, the prevalence of mixed-status families means that all the parties in family court 
proceedings often will not share the same immigration status. Though immigration status issues 
arise in a number of ways, parties often inject immigration issues in family law proceedings when 
they perceive, rightly or wrongly, an advantage in highlighting differences in immigration status. 
As demonstrated in the next section, parties regularly ask courts to infuse differences in status with 
meaning in the application of malleable and subjective family law standards; and many courts 
readily comply. 
III. IMMIGRATION STATUS IN FAMILY COURT 
A systemic review of family court decisions and rulings provides important insights into the 
range of approaches that family courts adopt in addressing immigration status issues. While drawn 
from a diverse range of cases, such decisions reveal patterns and commonality in the courts' 
approaches to immigration status issues that bridge jurisdictions and underlying family law issues. 37 
Four distinct approaches emerge from the cases. When immigration status issues are 
considered, courts adopt approaches of: (1) Discrimination; (2) Manipulation; (3) Obfuscation; and 
(4) Accommodation. The discussion below explains and provides examples of each of these 
approaches. For each classification, the article identifies and analyzes several key issues that spring 
from the examples. 
35. ld. In Los Angeles, forty-seven percent of children live in mixed-status families. 
36. ld. at 16. 
37. This section grounds its analysis in a survey of available family court decisions that evidence the impact of 
immigration status on family law. It is important to acknowledge that such cases can vary greatly in important respects. Family 
court decisions arise in matters as distinct as child custody disputes between parents, state intervention under the rubric of child 
protection, actions to enforce child support, and divorce. Each of these areas has its own nuanced legal tests and standards of 
proof. Further, most family law decisions, like most immigration decisions, are unreported. Malleable family law standards and 
deferential review make appeals difficult, reducing the availability of appellate decisions. Finally, cases drawn from a number of 
jurisdictions inevitably invoke variance in the applicable legal standards. 
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A. Discrimination - iiI Have a Problem With Your Immigration Situation ,,38 
At one extreme, family court judges make statements that openly express bias and base 
decisions on immigration status per se. The opening quote of this article is one example. In 
another example, a Georgia trial judge refused to grant custody of a child to her undocumented 
father, remarking that he had a "problem with [the father's] INS situation.,,39 After the father 
petitioned for custody, the court set a number of requirements for the father to demonstrate his 
capacity to care for his daughter. In particular, the court also ordered the father to "show that he is 
taking positive steps towards correcting legal status while in United States.',40 
The father made sufficient progress on all other fronts, but he was unable to regularize his 
immigration status. The record reflects that the father did hire an immigration attorney to review 
his situation, but that no avenues for immigration relief were available. The judge, however, denied 
custody and ultimately terminated the father's parental rights, finding that the father had "done 
nothing to legalize his residency in the United States.',4! Even if the father did later attempt to 
legalize his status, the court opined that he "would face deportation, [and] the child could then be 
returned to protective custody or taken with her father to 'an unknown future in Mexico. ",42 
Further demonstrating the importance that the judge placed on immigration status, the court also 
terminated the parental rights of the child's mother because she "lived with and financially relied 
upon a man who ... was an illegal alien. ,,43 
Though this decision ultimately was reversed on appeal, such outcomes are not isolated and 
relatively few family court decisions are appealed. In this case, the appellate decision shines a rare 
light on a trial record demonstrating the bias that many undocumented immigrants experience in 
family court. And even as it reversed the decision, the appellate court relied on factual 
disagreements; it did little to discredit the trial court's naked reliance on immigration status as a 
basis for decision. Together, the ruling of the trial court and the thinly reasoned appellate review 
serve to highlight a number of aspects critical to the experiences and expectations of undocumented 
immigrants in the courts. 
1. The Dominant Narrative of "Illegality" as a Perceived License to Discriminate 
Judges who discriminate on the basis of immigration status reflect acceptance, consciously 
or otherwise, of a pervasive societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of unworthiness 
and "illegality" regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular sense regarding the 
38. In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825,831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 832. 
42. [d. 
43. M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 829. 
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availability of protection from prejudice and discrimination.44 
Deeply ingrained and consistently reinforced conceptions of undocumented immigrants as 
"illegal" shape the way they are perceived and treated. As noted above, the concept of "illegal" 
immigration is a social and legal construct. "Alien" is similarly constructed. As a strictly legal 
matter, an "alien" is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States.,,45 Yet it would seem 
unusual, though technically correct, if Prime Minister Tony Blair's recent speech to a joint session 
of Congress were described as "Alien Addresses Congress." In common usage, the term "alien" 
has been reserved for pejorative use. 
Beyond its legal definition, the term "alien" plays a key role in a broader cultural context by 
accentuating the "otherness" of immigrants. The terms "illegal" and "alien" "go far beyond bein! 
mere labels, and instead ... creat[e] intentional and unintentional interactions with other laws." 
The term "alien" serves as "a device that intellectually legitimizes the mistreatment of noncitizens 
and helps to mask human suffering ... , Persons have dignity and their rights should be respected. 
Aliens have neither dignity nor rights.',47 Expanding the phrase from "alien" to "illegal alien" 
deepens the effect, creating a "pejorative term that implies criminality, thereby suggesting that 
persons who fall in this category deserve punishment, not legal protection.'.48 
As society has acted on the impulse to restrict legal protections and privileges available to 
noncitizens in general and undocumented inunigrants in particular, the dominant narrative that 
undocumented immigrants are unworthy of legal protections is reinforced. For example, the 
imposition of sanctions against employers hiring undocumented workers accompanied the 
legalization of the 1980s.49 This increased the vulnerability of undocumented workers who were 
now legally excluded from the workplace and able to work only through participation in an 
underground economy. 50 Similarly, high profile cases contribute to the sense of vulnerability. The 
Supreme Court's recent Hoffman Plastic decision found undocumented immigrants ineligible for a 
particular narrow form of relief under federal labor law.51 Though the actual reach of the decision is 
limited, it has emboldened employers who now aggressively seek discovery regarding the 
immigration status of complaining workers and argue that the protections of wide swathes of 
employment and labor law do not apply.52 Though often unsuccessful, the intimidation of workers 
44. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 169 (discussing "the way legality and deportability are constructed, imposed, and 
internalized in immigrant communities"). 
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2005). 
46. Benson, supra note 18, at 484. 
47. Aliens and u.s. Immigration Laws, supra note 19, at 273. 
48. Id. at 276. 
49. Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1986). 
50. See Mendelson, supra note 19, at 203. 
5 I. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
52. See, e.g., Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 FJd 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding protective order barring discovery into 
immigration status of workers alleging discrimination based on national origin); see also Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of 
the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 315-16 
(2004). 
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makes the legal protection of workers more difficult, and further distances the experiences of 
undocumented immigrants from those of persons with legal immigration status. Although legal 
battles regarding worker protection are ongoing, even the fact that courts are debating whether 
undocumented immigrants might be less deserving of legal protection than their similarly situated 
colleagues who possess a valid immigration status does not go unnoticed. 
Outside the workplace, extensive refonns of welfare laws in 1996 restricted immigrant 
access to many public benefits. 53 Closer to home for most hardworking immigrants, arguments 
abound regarding whether the lack of lawful immigration status alone is sufficient to deny a broad 
range of privileges from drivers licenses54 to higher education. 55 A matter as seemingly simple as 
denying a drivers license "exacerbates immigrant fears of arrest and deportation, limits access to 
jobs, and ~enerally increases immigrant vulnerability to exploitation in the workplace and 
elsewhere." 6 These distinctions in rights and privileges serve to distance undocumented 
immigrants from the mainstream population and reinforce the dominant narrative that 
undocumented immigrants are different, "other" and "illegal" in a sense that extends well beyond 
immigration status.57 This narrative can have particularly harmful effects in mixed status families. 
Differences in immigration status have long been acknowledged as creating a disparity in 
power and thus great potential for abuse. It is all too common that a person with legal immigration 
status uses threats of deportation to intimidate and control those who do not have legal immigration 
status. 58 But beyond threats specific to deportation, the conception that undocumented immigrants 
deserve lesser legal protections and privileges is often exploited. It is often a litigant with status 
who raises immigration issues in family court proceedings. 59 Further, many undocumented 
53. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. IV, §§ 
400(3), 400(5), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (asserting that "aliens have been applying for and receiving public benefits ... at 
increasing rates" and that "[i]t is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility and sponsorship agreements 
in order to assure that aliens be selfreliant in accordance with national immigration policy"). See generally Michael 1. Wishnie, 
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.V. 1. REv. 493 
(2001). 
54. NAT'l IMMIGRATION LAW eTR., IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC BENEFITS DRIVER'S LICENSES, available at 
http://www.niic.org/immspbsIDLslindex.htm (last visited June 1,2005). 
55. See Michael A. Olivas. IIRIRA. The DREAM Act. and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & V.L. 435 
(2004). 
56. End of Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 1504. 
57. Aliens and U.s. Immigration Laws, supra note 19. at 264 (arguing that terminology has "significant legal, social and 
political importance"). 
58. Indeed, this is one of the reasons Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which provides foreign 
nationals a limited ability to "self-petition" for immigration benefits if they have been a victim of domestic abuse by a U.S. 
citizen or lawful permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii) (2002); see also Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("courts have noted that allowing parties to inquire about the immigration status of other parties, when not 
relevant, would present a 'danger of intimidation [that] would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights. "') (quoting Liu v. Donna 
Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002»); V.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, How Do I Apply For 
Immigration Benefits as a Battered Spouse or Child? (Oct. 31, 2003). available at http://uscis.gov/graphicslhowdoilbattered.htm 
(last visited June I, 2005). 
59. See, e.g .. In re Florentino, No. 259664-IT, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 1896, at *17 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2 Aug. 9, 
2002) (claiming that the trial court erred through "failure to in any way consider the fact that the Respondent father is not a U.S. 
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immigrants have themselves internalized the message that lack of legal status will preclude a 
favorable judgment and are therefore hesitant to pursue their rights. 60 
This is particularly true in the family court context. Margot Mendelson conducted a series 
of interviews with undocumented women and found that they "all regarded the courts and the 
custody laws as adversarial to their interests. . .. The women shared an overriding sense of their 
own vulnerability in the legal setting.,,61 The women "unanimously accepted their [documented] 
husbands' threats to separate them from their children. Not a single woman I met said that she 
ignored, dismissed or rolled her eyes at her husband's threats.,,62 Further, they "all considered 
legalization to be their only means of responding to or fighting against their husbands' threats.'.63 
When the sense of disentitlement extends to the parent-child relationship, it is a profound statement 
of the success of the dominant narrative in distancing undocumented immigrants from mainstream 
society and, indeed, humanity.64 
It is in this context that judges must recognize and reject discriminatory arguments. But 
countering a dominant societal narrative is not always easy. Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted, 
"[h]abit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable to distinguish between ... alien and 
citizen .... ,.65 As discussed in the next section, the pervasive sense that the law permits differential 
treatment of immigrants is accurate only to a limited point. Greater sensitivity and understanding 
are required to counter the dominant narrative. Judges must reject habit in favor of analysis. 
2. Fundamental Rights and Equal Protection 
American law is "deeply divided about the significance of the status of alienage for the 
allocation of rights and benefits in our society.,,66 In general, "state anti-immigrant 
discrimination ... has been subject to strict scrutiny (and therefore invalidated), but ... identical 
federal discrimination has been subject only to rational basis review (and therefore upheld).,,67 
Congress, then, may distinguish between citizens and noncitizens in the exercise of its power over 
immigration. In the area of immigration law, distinctions applied to noncitizens have been upheld 
even though they would not survive constitutional scrutiny in any other context.68 Even beyond the 
citizen and is not a legal resident of the United States"). 




64. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTlTImON AND FAMILY VALUES 91 (Lawrence Hill Books 
1998) (noting that "as a tool of subordination and a disavowal of common humanity, denial of the right to marry was secondary 
to the denial of parental ties"). 
65. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
66. Bosniak, supra note g, at 1055. "[N]obody argues that aliens are treated identically with citizens in every 
circumstance." I d. at 1064. 
67. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of Immigration Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 
N.Y.U. 1. REv. 493, 496 (2001). 
68. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (upholding racially based deportation law 
HeinOnline -- 11 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol’y 58 2005
58 TEXAS HISPANIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [Vol. 11:45 
border, Congress has great leeway to treat alienage as a basis for less favorable treatment in a 
variety of contexts as long as such treatment is not wholly irrational.69 Yet the reach of the federal 
immigration power does have limits, and beyond "matters of admission, exclusion, and 
deportation. . . the alien inhabits the domain of territorially present persons where different and 
more protective rules against government power apply.,,7o For example, in Wong Wing v. United 
States, the Court rejected the government's attempt to punish violations of immigration without a 
trial.7l 
States, on the other hand, are much more limited in their ability to treat alienage as a basis 
of distinction. The Supreme Court has long recognized that noncitizens are protected against 
invidious state action by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses: 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the 
protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its iurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These 
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial iurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, 
or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equallaws.72 
In the exercise of state power, then, distinctions "based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.,,73 Noncitizens "as a 
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate.,,74 
Indeed, "even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized 
as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.,,75 The fact 
that "a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may 
for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's 
directed at Chinese laborers); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (finding that Congress may discriminate between 
mothers and fathers in setting parameters for family-based immigration); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the 
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens."). 
69. Matthews, 426 U.S. at 83 (1976) (upholding Congressional denial of Medicaid benefits to certain noncitizens as an 
extension of the federal power over immigration). 
70. Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1097-98. 
71. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 239 (1896). 
72. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,210 (1982) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has noted similar protection against federal action) ("[W]e have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment protects 
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government."). 
73. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (internal citations omitted). 
74. [d. (citing u.s. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n. 4 (1938». 
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. 
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territorial perimeter.,,76 Until an undocumented immi~t "leaves the iurisdiction - either 
voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States - he 
is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish.,,77 
Asserting that undocumented immigrants are entitled to due process and equal protection 
"only begins the inquiry. The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has 
been violated78 •••• States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where 
such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.,,79 Yet when 
constitutional protections are denied, states rarely can present sufficient justification to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.so When the rights in question are fundamental constitutional rights, 
differential applications of state power on the basis of immigration status will violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Moreover, "the interests of parents in the care, custody and control of their children ... is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the COurt."SI Although family 
law is generally a state realm, "the U.S. Constitution provides parameters that limit the states' 
ability to defme and regulate family rights and obligations.,,82 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized ''the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations oflife, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy these privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men."S3 The Court further emphasized the special protection afforded 
the relationship between parents and children in Pierce v. Society o/Sisters when it noted that "[t]he 
child is not the mere creation of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.,,84 
Although the Court occasionally is in disagreement regarding the constitutional rationale for 
extending protection to the parent-child relationship, there is no question of the Court's continued 
affirmation of limits on state action regarding this relationship. 85 
76. Id. at215. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. !d. at 225. 
80. Cases where equal protection challenges have generally been rejected involve the use of citizenship as a means of 
determining which persons are allowed to participate "in the political community." See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 
438 (1982) (upholding denial of jobs as probation officers to noncitizens). 
81. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
82. Annette Ruth Appall, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 688 (2001). 
83. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
84. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
85. Appall, supra note 82, at 704-05 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000» ("[A)t least eight justices affIrmed 
that the Constitution protects the parent-child relationship from undue governmental interference, although a majority of justices 
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Finally, the "vast majority of today's immigrants are people of color.,,86 As such, "tenns 
like 'alien' ... have racial connotations in the modem United States."S7 Courts, therefore, "should 
be sensitive to the fact that alienage in certain circumstances may substitute for race."gg 
B. Manipulation - Tailoring Family Court Outcomes to Achieve Immigration Outcomes 
More common than decisions based on simple discrimination against undocumented 
immigrants are utilitarian decisions that manipulate family court outcomes to facilitate particular 
immigration results. Generally, these courts invoke the flexible equitable power of the family court 
in ways that will assist immigrants in reaching legal status. 
In contrast to discrimination cases, in manipulation cases the request that the court calculate 
immigration status into the outcome often originates with the person who lacks legal immigration 
status. Manipulation can be tricky and courts that try it do so with decidedly mixed results. 
For example, in Velez v. Velez a Connecticut divorce court agreed with the parties that it 
was in the best interests ofthe litigants' U.S. citizen child to live with his undocumented Colombian 
mother in New York City where "they would have a support network of extended family and 
friends.,,89 The ongoing interaction of the two parents was relatively stable, with no visitation 
difficulties and current child support payments.90 
But the husband, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Colombia, refused to continue an 
immigration petition that he had filed prior to the breakdown of the marriage and that would permit 
the wife to obtain legal pennanent resident statuS.91 In particular, he refused to execute an affidavit 
of financial support that was required by the immigration service.92 The court criticized this refusal, 
noting that the husband "appears not to appreciate the quandary in which this places the wife and 
child.,,93 Further, said the court, 
he does not acknowledge the effects of his failure to cooperate with [his 
wife's] citizenship or residency application, should she be deported, 
would have on his relationship with his son. He does not consider the 
effect on the son, an American citizen, if the child were required to reside 
could not agree on a rationale for the decision. "). 
86. End of Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 1505. 
87. Id. at 1508. Of course, race, like alienage, is socially and legally. constructed. 
88. Id. at 1507. 
89. Velez v. Velez, No. 10 1481, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1994). 
90. !d. at *3. 
91. Id. at *6. 
92. Id. The requirements for a person petitioning for a family member became more onerous through provisions 
introduced in 1996 and now codified at 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(4) (2005). The new financial obligations also are designed to create 
long lasting financial responsibility for sponsored immigrants such that many financial obligations survive dissolution of the 
marriages that prompted them. 
93. Id. 
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in Columbia [sic] when he has the opportunity to reside here, a priceless 
right, many risk much for. Nor does he appear to show concern for the 
impact and effect upon his son were the mother to be deported and 
separated from the child.94 
61 
The court labeled the husband's position "illogical" and inferred "that his motive can only be spite 
and vindictiveness.,,95 
In its ruling, the court balked at the wife's request that it enter a broad order that the 
husband cooperate in resolving the wife's immigration status, but instead the court refused to grant 
a divorce. The court entered only a separation in hopes that perpetuation of the marriage "may ... 
enhance the wife's claim for legal residency status and provide her some insulation from the threat 
of deportation.,,96 The court also ordered the payment of alimony because the wife, "being legally 
unable to work, cannot ex;loit her demonstrated earning capacity and is in need of continued 
support from the husband." The court did note, however, that the wife's "[l]egal residence in the 
United States or legal employment of the wife shall be deemed a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a modification of the alimony award.,,98 
Though the court's impulse here is to be helpful to an undocumented immigrant, the court's 
ultimate decision is unabashedly based on immigration status. There is no question that the court 
would have granted the divorce and would not have ordered alimony but for the wife's lack oflegal 
immigration status. The result is expressly tailored in an attempt to lead to the wife's acquisition of 
legal immigration status. A discussion of some considerations and dangers of such manipulation 
follows. 
1. The Best Interests of the Child 
The ability of a family court to manipulate the outcome of a family court proceeding to 
facilitate an immigration outcome is a reflection of the flexible and equitable nature of many family 
court proceedings. While the outcome sought by the courts in these cases are generally 
sympathetic, manipulation can make outcomes inconsistent, unpredictable and, at least from the 
perspective of some parties, unfair. 
In some cases, the requested manipulation may require only an awareness of immigration 
law and sensitivity to its requirements. For example, parties might request that an adoption 
proceeding be expedited since an ado~tion that is finalized after the child reaches age 16 is not 
recognized for immigration purposes. 9 Similarly, seeking to take advantage of a provision of 
immigration law that provides an opportunity for court dependents to acquire legal status, parties 
94. Velez, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139, at *6. 
95. [d. at *6-*7. 
96. !d. at * 10. 
97. [d. 
98. Id.at*12-*I3. 
99. 8 U.S.C. § 110 1 (b)(I)(E) (2005). 
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might seek a guardianship and request that the family court make special findings. loo The parties in 
such instances plainly ask for special consideration to achieve immigration consequences. In such 
cases, the requested manipulation does not implicate the rights of adverse parties, but not all 
requested manipulations are so straightforward. 
From the Velez example above, Mr. Velez certainly could complain that denying him a 
divorce based on his wife's immigration status constitutes discrimination on the basis of 
immigration status. Imagine for a moment that Mrs. Velez sought the divorce - if she had been 
denied because of her lack of immigration status, the discrimination would be readily apparent. In 
either case, the judge is reaching a decision on the basis of immigration status that would not have 
resulted if the parties were all U. S. citizens. 
Possibly the Velez court grounded justification for such an outcome in its mandate to 
consider the best interests of the child involved. From the decision, it is apparent that the court did 
ponder the consequences for the child if the mother was not able to achieve legal immigration 
status. In contrast to Velez, a Tennessee court rejected a wife's request, similar to that in Velez for 
separation in lieu of divorce, despite the "collateral consequence" that divorce would result in the 
wife's loss oflawful immigration status.IOI It is appealing to posit the child's best interest as reason 
to support differentiation on the basis of immigration status, at least where the outcome, as in Velez, 
did not interfere with rights of either parent to the care and custody of the child. 102 But the right to 
form and dissolve marriage bonds is also constitutionally protected, and Mr. Velez's right to 
dissolve his marriage is certainly burdened on the basis of his wife's immigration status.103 
The consideration of the child's best interests in Velez also highlights the absence of such 
considerations in immigration law. With one discrete exception, immigration law is completely 
unconcerned with the best interests of a child in an immigrant family.l04 Indeed, immigration law 
treats children as objects, and their voices and concerns are largely ignored. lOS Immigration law 
concentrates power in the hands of sponsors, i.e., persons with legal immigration status, not the 
people who they might sponsor, i.e., beneficiaries. lo6 In immigration law, children may be 
beneficiaries, but never sponsors. Mrs. Velez needed her husband's cooperation because 
immigration law did not allow her U.S. citizen child to sponsor her. Mrs. Velez turned to the family 
court in her effort to force her husband's cooperation precisely because immigration law provided 
her with no recourse. 
100. 8 U.S.C. § I 10 I (a)(27)(J) (2005); see also Thronson, supra note 32, at 1003-13 (examining special immigrant juvenile 
status). 
101. Madu v. Madu, No. MI999-02302-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 708, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000). 
102. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) ("The Due Process Clause does not permit a state to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be 
made."). 
103. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
104. See 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)(27)(J) (2005) (providing special immigrant juvenile status for court dependents and 
incorporating a best interests of the child standard into its eligibility requirements). 
105. Thronson, supra note 32, at 990-92. 
106. Id. at 992-94. 
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2. Don't Know Much About Immigration 
Getting immigration law wrong can have severe consequences on both the immigration 
front and the family front. For family judges tempted to engage in even the most benign 
manipulation, it is important that the quirks of unforgiving immigration laws be understood not only 
to avoid harm on the immigration front, but also to ensure that there is actually any reason to 
support the requested manipulation of the outcome in the family law case. 
Given the relative unfamiliarity with immigration law of most family court judges, it is easy 
for careless judges to be duped. 107 In a disastrous case, a family court judge transferred custody of 
two undocumented children from an undocumented mother to a biological father with legal 
permanent resident status. Even though the father had not contacted the children for the last seven 
years, the court found that the best interests of the children were served by the transfer of the 
children to the father's out-of-state home. The only stated reason for this decision was that the 
father "can lawfully immiFate (sic) both minor children and obtain the status of a United States 
Citizen on their behalf.,,10 The judge had accepted the argument of the father's attorney, which 
was not challenged by the mother's attorney, that the children had to be in the father's custody to 
obtain legal status. 
But immigration law does not require that the father have custody to petition for his 
children. 109 In fact, the only immigration law provision that had been argued to the court was a 
citizenship provision that Congress had repealed three years earlier, which even prior to repeal 
would not have been applicable to the situation at hand. The judge's rationale for imposing drastic 
consequences on the family was completely unfounded. 
In a similar vein, although the Velez decision gives few precise details of the wife's pending 
immigration matter, it provides enough information to infer that the husband had filed a petition for 
his wife. It is true, as the judge assumed, that in such circumstances, with a few exceptions related 
to domestic violence, 1I0 the petition could not be approved after the termination of the marriage. 
Unfortunately for Mrs. Velez, simply being married to a U.S. citizen is not sufficient - immigration 
law vests enormous power in the person with legal status and relegates the beneficiaries of 
immigration petitions, like Mrs. Velez, to a passive status. III As such, without the active 
participation of her husband in pursuing the petition, the continued marriage may serve no purpose. 
107. See, e.g., Nunez v. Alonso, No. 04-D-311872-C (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. Farn. Div. hearing Feb. 25, 2004) 
(recording on file with author) (wherein the presiding family court judge stated, "I'm not an immigration attorney. I don't know 
a whole lot about it"). 
108. Rodriguez v. Rico, No. D-303041 at 2 (Nev. Eighth Jud. Disl. CI. Farn. Div. filed Nov. 6, 2003) (copy on file with 
author). 
109. To petition for his out-of-wedlock child, immigration law requires that a father legitimate the child or establish the 
existence of a bona fide parent-child relationship. Of these, only the former requires that the legitimating parent have legal 
custody of the child, and only at the time ofIegitimation. 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(b)(1)(C), (D) (2005). 
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1 I 54(a)(I)(A)(iii), (B)(iii) (2005) (permitting self-petitioning by battered spouses and children). 
111. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2005). 
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Judges who consider manipulation of family court outcomes to achieve particular 
immigration results need to take great care. Even valid attempts to secure legal inunigration status 
for parties are not justified in every case, as equal protection concerns and the infringement of 
fundamental rights are implicated. 
C. Obfuscation - Masking the Real Impact of Immigration Status 
Family courts sometimes purport to rely on reasons unrelated to inunigration status in 
reaching their decisions; while in reality their stated reasoning is simply a pretext for a decision 
based on immigration status. Subjective family law standards such as the best interests of the child 
'''can mask all manner of biases, views, political interest, misconceptions and, indeed, plain 
ignorance. ",112 Courts that obfuscate, intentionally or obliviously, often openly discuss immigration 
issues but then insist that their stated rationale is not a proxy for a decision based on immigration 
status. 
For example, Margarita T. was ordered to remain with the Department of Social Services 
after a trial court, applying Nebraska's statutory standard for removal, found that she "lacked proper 
parental care by reason of the fault or habits of her parents."lI3 Shawn, her mother, conceded the 
fault of drug addiction, but her father James appealed and contested the presence of any fault on his 
behalf justifying removal of Margarita.114 On appeal, the court noted that there was "no evidence 
that Margarita was not properly cared for. ,,115 In fact, at the time of her removal Margarita was "in 
good physical condition, pro~erly nourished, with no indication that she had been neglected" and 
the "home appeared clean.'" 6 James had taken full responsibility for Margarita's care and had 
arranged childcare for her while he was working after Shawn's drug use and unreliability 
escalated. 117 
Still, the appellate court upheld the trial court's removal of Margarita, unsatisfied that the 
"protection of Margarita is ... assured.,,118 On its face, the court's articulation of James' "fault" 
under the Nebraska statute was his inability to provide adequate assurance of his availability to 
protect Margarita. Underlying the court's unwillingness to accept past performance as an indication 
of James' ability to protect Margarita in the future was the assertion that "James' status as an illegal 
immigrant [means that] his future presence to provide any supervision of the care of Margarita can 
112. Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 
1998 U. ILL. 1. REv. 253,318 (1998) (quoting Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases, 33 FAM. 
& CONCILIATIONS CTS. REV. 361, 362 (1995)); see also Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, 
Race and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. 1. REV. 577, 608 (1997) (discussing how the best interest standard's 
subjectivity and indetenninacy disproportionately impacts poor families and families of color). 
113. In re Margarita 1., No. A-95-530, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 397, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1995). 
114. Id. at *11. 
115. Id. at *9. 
116. Id. 
117. !d. at *10. 
118. Margarita T., 1995 Ncb. App. LEXIS 397, at *13. 
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be measured only one day at a time, as he is here only so long as he can avoid deportation.,,119 The 
court denies that it is deciding that lack of legal immigration status is a "fault" but rather insists that 
it is concerned about James' possible absence. In contrast to its speculation regarding deportation, 
however, the court was troubled by James' acknowledged absences due to long hours at work, 
noting that "James could not be with his daughter 24 hours a day" and that "obviously we do not 
view James' employment as a fault or habit" under the removal statute.120 
The court purports to look beyond immigration status to factual consequences attached to 
that status. But in attempting to do this, the court adopts several assumptions and factual errors that 
are common to courts that are obfuscating the effects of immigration status on their reasoning. 
1. Overstating Precariousness - One Day at a Time 
The court's articulation of James' "fault" reduces to an assertion that his situation of living 
in the United States without legal immigration status was an exceedingly precarious, day-to-day 
existence. Such assumptions by courts are not uncommon. As noted above, a Georgia court found 
a mother's living situation unstable simply because she "lived with and fmancially relied upon a 
man who ... was an illegal alien.,,121 Another court noted that if a party was "gainfully employed, 
the circumstances of that employment appear precarious at best, because of immigration status 
issues.,,122 
To be sure, noncitizens without legal immigration status generally are removable from the 
United States. 123 And as noted above, the possibility of removal plays a central role in the way the 
dominant narrative shapes the lives of undocumented immigrants. But in light of various claims to 
relief from removal, "a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented 
rpersonl will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been completed.,,124 But 
even if a particular immigrant does not "enioYrl an inchoate federal permission to remain,,,125 this 
does not mean that imminent deportation is likely. 
In fiscal year 2002, removal hearings resulted in the deportation of 148, 619 persons, of 
whom 77,860 were deported on a basis other than criminal charges. 126 At this rate, accepting the 
lowest estimate of the undocumented population at seven million, it would take nearly ninety years 
119. Id. at *15. 
120. Id. at *14-·15. 
121. In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 829 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
122. In re Vaughn, No. 3-560/03-0036,2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 663, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 13,2003). 
123. 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(I)(B) (2005) ("Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act] or any other law of the United States is deportable."). 
124. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982). 
125. [d.; see also Benson, supra note 18, at 484 (noting that given the complexities of immigration law, it is not unnsual 
that even the immigrant herself does not fully understand her immigration status and applicable protections from removal). 
126. 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Table 46) 194, 
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/sharedlaboutus/statisticslENF2002.pdf (last visited June 1,2005). 
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to remove all current undocumented immigrants not convicted of crimes and thus brought to the 
attention of immigration officials. This timeline, moreover, would be longer if new arrivals are 
considered. The relative stability of the undocumented population is not new, and has long been 
recognized and grappled with by the courts. 127 
Also, current policies prioritize border enforcement over interior enforcement, meaning that 
persons already in the country who are not involved in criminal activity are exceedingly unlikely to 
face removal. Further, federal law has provisions designed to ameliorate the power of abusers 
based on threats of deportation and thus it prohibits an "adverse determination of admissibility or 
deportability ... using information furnished solely by ... a spouse or parent who has battered the 
alien or subjected the alien to extreme cruelty.,,128 
This is not to say that deportations do not happen and that people's lives are not uprooted 
when they do. 129 The specter of deportation is real for undocumented immigrants and it plays a 
critical role in their marginalization by broader society. But blanket assumptions and stereotypes 
regarding precariousness must give way to a factually specific inquiry about the particular 
immigrant. For example, in a Washington custody matter, the court relied on detailed reports from 
social workers to conclude that "while Simon ... is an illegal alien he is not likely to flee as he is 
employed with a good job and he is married.,,130 Removal proceedings against Simon may be 
initiated tomorrow, but statistically speaking, this is unlikely. Further, even undocumented 
immigrants who do find themselves in removal proceedings are entitled to due process protections 
that generally provide some time between the initiation of removal proceedings and actual removal. 
Here again, family courts must resist assumptions based on the dominant narrative and 
make sure that any assumptions hidden in their decisions are based on true assessments of the 
probabilities and risks involved in particular cases. 
2. Imposing Impossible Conditions 
In Margarita T., the court implicitly set the condition that James obtain legal immigration 
status, since nothing short of that would have satisfied the court of his continuing availability to 
protect Margarita. Since James was not eligible for any form of legal immigration status at the 
time, this was an impossible condition. The court in In re MM., similarly set an impossible 
condition when it ordered a father to "show that he is taking positive steps towards correcting legal 
127. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (noting "the creation of a substantial 'shadow population' of illegal migrants-numbering in 
the millions-within our borders. This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, 
encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents. "). 
128. 8 V.S.c. § 1367(a)(I )(A) (2005). 
129. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed 
Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1936, 1951 (2000) ("The current system of mandatory detention and mandatory deportation 
seriously undermines ... family values."). 
130. In re Florentino, No. 25966-4-11, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 1896, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 2 Aug. 9, 2002). 
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status while in United States."l3I 
Family courts routinely set conditions that parties must meet before the court makes 
decisions regarding child custody. Employing broad equitable powers, it is an everyday occurrence 
for a family court to demand actions such as attendance at parenting classes, completion of drug 
rehabilitation, or payment of child support as family court cases proceed. Occasionally, however, 
courts illegitimately use this routine device to mask the impact of immigration status on decisions 
by attaching consequences to conditions that are based on wildly inaccurate assumptions about 
immigration law and are impossible to meet. 
3. Hidden Assumptions Regarding Family Unity 
Silently, the Margarita T. court made a common and telling assumption regarding what 
would happen if James actually was removed from the United States. If James took Margarita with 
him out of the country, he would have no problem remaining available to protect her. His 
unavailability, therefore, is entirely predicated on the unspoken assumption that Margarita would be 
separated from him and left behind in the unlikely event of James' removal. This assumption is all 
too common.132 This, of course, is an issue that arises only for a mixed status family where a 
parent's right to remain in the United States is not equal to that of a child. 
But children of deported parents commonly leave the country with their parents. 133 In 
practice, "U.S. citizen children born of alien parents in the United States are easily deportable.,,134 
While compelling arguments have been advanced that the removal of the parents of U.S. citizens 
violates the child's constitutional rights against family separation and "de facto deportation,,,135 
these arguments have not been successful. 136 
m. In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
132. See, e.g" In re DR, 2004 COI111. Super. LEXIS 325, at *34 (COI111. Super. Ct. Feb, 9, 2004) (fmding that a mother's 
"return to Honduras renders her effectively unable to serve as a responsible parent'~); Interview with Jane Femiano, Clark County 
Office of the Special Public Defender (Aug. 12, 2004) (explaining that in some jurisdictions, courts simply assume that the 
parental rights of deported parents will be terminated). 
133. In cases involving parents who voluntarily leave the United States, courts routinely award custody or visitation to a 
foreign parent, even if this means that a U.S. citizen child is forced to leave the United States unwillingly. See, e.g., Tischendorf 
v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Mil111. 1982) (rejecting the argument that the constitutional right ofa U.S. citizen not to be 
compelled to leave the United States was violated by a family court order that child visit father in Germany). 
134. Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 
SAN DIEGO lNT'L 1.1. I, 15 n.43 (2001). 
135. See generally Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own 
Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. QUARTERLY 49 I (1995); Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of 
Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 3S (1988); Sonia Starr and Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of 
International Law, 21 BERKELEY 1. INT'L L. 213 (2003). 
136. Leila Rothwell, VAWA 2000's Retention of the "Extreme Hardship" Standard for Battered Women in Cancellation of 
Removal Cases: Not Your Typical Deportation Case, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 555, 602 (2001); See also Bill Piatt, Born as Second 
Class Citizens in the U,S.A,; Children afUndocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1988) (noting that "citizen 
children ... have not been successful in pressing the view that the deportation of their undocumented parents is tantamount to the 
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For example, the Third Circuit found that the undisputed right of a U.S. citizen child to 
reside wherever she wished did not confer any immigration benefit on her parents because "an 
infant of ... tender years cannot make a conscious choice of residence, whether in the United States 
or elsewhere, and merely desires, if she can be thought to have any choice, to be with her 
parents.,,!37 The parents "could decide that it would be best for [the child] to remain in the United 
States with foster parents ... [b Jut this would be their decision involving the custody and care of 
their child, taken in their capacity as her parents .... ,,138 
In the immigration context, advocates rightly bemoan such decisions for the failure to 
adequately value children's rights and autonomy, but such decisions have a decidedly more positive 
aspect when viewed from the perspective of undocumented parents like James facing custody 
challenges in family court. Decisions upholding de Jacto deportations are validations that 
fundamental parental rights are not weakened by parents' lack of immigration status or even their 
imminent deportation. 
When courts implicitly determine that a child could not accompany a parent abroad they 
fail to recognize, or willingly subvert, a parent's fundamental rights. "It is the parents' role to 
decide what the good life is - how and with whom the child should live.,,139 Leaving the United 
States is not a sign that a parent is unfit, and not a ground to undermine parents' role in their 
children's lives. 
D. Accommodation 
If some family courts manipulate the outcomes of family law cases to affect certain 
immigration outcomes for a party, others simply accommodate the collateral consequences of a 
party's immigration status in their decisions. In other words, they do not attempt to shape a party's 
immigration status, but rather simply respond to the consequences of that status. This is the largest, 
and by far most diverse, of the four categories. The cases in this category exhibit the range of 
challenges faced by undocumented immigrants. 
For example, in Korn v. Korn a wife held a temporary immigration status that did not 
authorize employment in the United States. !40 Her status was derived from her spouse, who was 
entitled to work under the terms of his Visa. 14! The trial court granted the couple a divorce, 
de facto deportation of the child"). 
137. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153,1158 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
138. Id. 
139. Appall, supra note 82, at 713 ("Unless the parents are unfit to make those decisions or have consented to let others 
make or share in making them, the state may not second-guess those decisions or sanction the decision-making power of others. 
Constitutional design and theory do not support the state's exercise of such power."). 
140. Kom v. Kom, 867 So. 2d 338, 340-41 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
141. Id. The husband, who played violin for a symphony orchestra, held an 0-1 Visa available to persons with 
extraordinary abilities. His wife held an 0-3 Visa as the "spouse or child" of a person holding an 0-1 Visa. Because her status 
required a marriage to an 0-1 Visa holder, dissolution of the marriage would terminate her eligibility. This is not an uncommon 
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resulting in the wife's loss of her derivative immigration status and of her legal right to remain in 
the United States. Although the court acknowledged that the wife could return to Israel where she 
would be able to support herself financially, the court's award of prima~ physical custody of the 
child to the wife was conditioned on her remaining in the United States. 14 Acknowledging that the 
wife would not be authorized to work in the United States, the court ordered the husband to pay 
substantial alimony provided that she remain in the United States. 143 
Unlike the court in Velez, discussed above, the court here did not deny a divorce to achieve 
a particular effect on a party's immigration status. Still, the court plainly tailored its decision to 
accommodate the immigration consequences that follow from the family law decision. Such 
accommodations are common, and arise in a variety of contexts. Some of the more frequent 
accommodation issues are discussed below. 
I. The Lack of Employment Authorization 
Restraints on employment related to immigration status are a common source of requests 
for accommodation. Since 1986, U.S. law has prohibited hiring persons unable to establish their 
employment authorization by mandating that employers verify the identity and eligibility of all new 
hires through the examination of specific documents. 1M Laws governing who qualifies for 
employment authorization are complex and separate from, though related, to the concept of legal 
immigration status. It is possible to have legal immigration status without qualifying for 
employment authorization. 14 Alternately, in rare instances it is possible to have employment 
authorization prior to the acquisition of legal immigration status based on a pending application. 146 
situation. See, e.g., Aaron Donovan, After 9/J 1, Searching For Way to Stay in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at B4 (explaining 
that a number of surviving spouses of immigrant workers who were killed in the September II, 2001, attack on the World Trade 
Center received notice that their immigration status was tenninated); see also Memorandum from Stuart Anderson, Executive 
Associate Commissioner, Office of Policy and Planning, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, to 
Michael A. Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Field Operations (Jan. 31, 2002), available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/PatriotGuidPub.pdf (last visited June I, 2005) (describing that although the USA 
Patriot Act conferred some limited immigration benefits on the families of victims, it did little for those whose status in the U.S. 
was derived from their spouse's nonimmigrant Visa, such as spouses ofH-IB Visa holders). 
142. Korn, 867 So. 2d at 345. 
143. Jd. 
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(A)-(B) (2005). Of note, this section of the law directs its prohibitions against employers, not 
undocumented workers. Other provisions do prohibit undocumented workers from presenting false documents or otherwise 
circumventing the verification system, such as 8 U.S.c. § 1324c(a) (2005), but the law does not otherwise prohibit undocumented 
immigrants from working. Immigration law, however, attaches severe consequences to past instances of unauthorized 
employment, insofar as past unauthorized employment becomes a barrier to obtaining legal status and the opportunity to obtain 
authorized employment. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (2005). In sharp contrast to the pervasive rhetoric of "illegal aliens" it is 
rare to hear mention of an "illegal employer." 
145. Many immigrants with legal immigration status whose status is derivative, such as Mrs. Kom, do not qualify for 
employment authorization and are dependent on the "principal" immigrant. See also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (providing that holders 
of most temporary Visas, such as tourist and student Visas, generally do not qualify for employment authorization). 
146. E.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9) (200S) (providing that in the last stages prior to adjudication of an application 
adjustment to permanent legal resident, employment authorization is available even though legal status has not been formally 
granted). 
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Overwhelmingly, though, immigrants who are not eligible for or in possession of legal immigration 
status simply cannot receive employment authorization. 
Not surprisingly, requests that a court take note of a lack of employment authorization 
generally come from the person lacking that authorization. On occasion, as in Korn, courts accept 
that lack of employment authorization in fact prevents employment and accommodate accordingly 
in making decisions. 147 At other times, although factual inquiry indicates that a person actually is 
employed, lack of employment authorization is raised as a shield to some legal obligations. This 
happens, for example, when an undocumented father asserts that he cannot be ordered to pay child 
support because he is not authorized to work. 148 
The fact that a worker is employed without authorization can raise a number of 
complications, particularly with regard to issues dependent on income, such as child support. For 
example, workers paid in cash under the table rarely have documentary proof of their incomes to 
establish the appropriate level of child support.149 At other times, income records are inaccurate due 
to immigration-related fraud. ISO Moreover, when support obligations are not met, garnishing the 
wages of an itinerate undocumented worker proves impossible. 
2. Eligibility for Benefits and Services 
Without doubt, immigration status affects eligibility for some governmental benefits and 
services. At times this is a direct result of immigration status, and at times an indirect effect based 
on collateral effects of the lack of immigration status such as lack of official identification. The 
inability to access benefits and services, in tum, can have profound effects as it may limit the range 
of services and supports that are available to assist families struggling. 
Some limitations are based on the eligibility requirement written into laws governing access 
by undocumented immigrants and even many legal permanent residents to direct subsistence federal 
benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps, and Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families. lsi Some barriers to services are less direct, as when an undocumented immigrant 
facing unmet child support obligations cannot take advanta~e of a government employment 
assistance program due to lack of employment authorization. 2 Difficulties in accessing other 
147. E.g., Ali v. Tiwana, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2535, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2003) (ordering that "father shall 
use his best efforts to obtain a green card or otherwise obtain the legal right [to) remain in and to work in the United States" and 
will not be liable for child support until authorized to work). 
148. Gomez v. Fernandez, No. R-120399 (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. hearing Mar. 22,2004) (copy on file with 
author). 
149. [d. 
ISO. Soto v. Garcia, No. R-I00186 (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dis!. Ct. Faro. Div. hearing May 26, 2004) (copy on file with author) 
(respondent in support action testified that income of undocumented coworkers was reported on his social security number). 
151. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS (2004), available at 
hnp:llwww.nilc.orglimmspbs/specialJovrvw jmm3Iigjed_pgms_03I 904.pdf (last visited June I, 2005) [hereinafter 
IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY)' 
152. Morill v. Dias-Cano, No. R-lll042 (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dis!. Ct. Fam. Div. hearing Mar. 9, 2004) (copy on file with 
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services and benefits are less obvious and more suspect. For example, a medical lab refused to take 
samples from one respondent in a paternity action who did not have state-issued identification. 153 
When such barriers arise, family courts struggle to accommodate. But courts also must be 
aware that the dominant narrative far overstates the extent to which immigrants are ineligible for 
benefits and services. Immigrants, even undocumented immigrants, do qualify for many state and 
federal government benefits and services. 154 While a court cannot rewrite federal benefits law, it 
can use its equitable power to go far in knocking down arbitrary barriers to services such as that of 
the medical lab. Courts must question assumptions and explore eligibility before rejecting services 
that it would order and make available to nonimmigrant families and individuals. 
Also, even if services are not available in the normal course of the court's experience and 
practice, other avenues may be available. For example, in In re Kittridge the court considered 
"whether New York City has the authority to remove a child from his mother, an undocumented 
alien, but then deny social services ordered bls the Family Court to rehabilitate and reunite the 
family because she is an undocumented alien.,,1 5 Relying on the New York Constitution's mandate 
that the "aid, care and suPg0rt of the needy are the public concerns and shall be provided by the 
state and its subdivision," 6 the court determined that the Department of Social Services "must 
provide, or arrange for Mrs. Kittridge to receive, all court-ordered services designed to reunite her 
with her son.,,157 
The barriers to needed services that immigration status imposes highlight a fundamental 
clash between the policies and goals underlying immigration law and family law. Laws stripping 
benefits and services on the basis of immigration status take no account for the family as a unit, and 
often inflict harm on U.S. citizen children through harsh treatment of immigrants. Further, 
immigration law lacks the flexibility that family law often demonstrates to adapt to the particular 
needs of a family. When society's laws are so completely out of sync, close scrutiny of the reasons 
for this can be a fertile ground for considerations of reform. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even this initial examination of available family court decisions makes evident the 
exaggerated role that immigration status often plays in many family court outcomes. Moreover, the 
author). 
153. Doe v. Flores, No. R-12194 (Nev. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. Fam. Div. hearing June 9, 2004) (copy on file with author). 
154. IMMIGRANT ELIGmILITY, supra note 151; see also NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRANTS AND PUBLIC 
BENEFITS: STATE-FUNDED BENEFIT PROGRAMS (2004), available at http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/sCbenefits/index.htm (last 
visited June I, 2005). 
155. In re Kittridge, 714 N.Y.S.2d 653, 654 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000). 
156. NY CONST. art. XVII, § I. 
157. Kittridge, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 657. 
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patterns that emerge from reviewing family court decisions indicate that the impact of immigration 
status in family court is not an irregular occurrence. Whether family courts are discriminating, 
manipulating, obfuscating or accommodating, immigration status influences, sometimes 
determinatively, the outcome of cases. 
The confluence of demographic patterns and immigration law reforms indicate that 
immigration status implications in family court will grow in frequency and complexity. As decision 
makers, practitioners and immigrants themselves grapple with arguments regarding immigration 
status in family court, the need for further research and thoughtful assessment is urgent. The 
unthinking application of immigration status in family law decisions does violence to immigrant 
families and it cannot continue. 
In particular, empirical study of the impact of immigration status on family court outcomes 
is needed. Such research would begin to bridge the gap between the vast numbers of people 
appearing in family courts everyday and the miniscule number of opinions that are reported. For 
example, what impact does immigration status have on the time that children of undocumented 
parents remain in foster care? How do perceived limitations on benefits and services for families 
affect family reunification? Do undocumented women fail to seek child support for their children in 
the belief that they are not eligible or at risk? These and many more issues warrant further research 
and scrutiny. 
Although much further research is needed, it is possible, from the analysis of available 
decisions in this article, to begin to posit some guidelines for courts and practitioners in family court 
when immigration status is at issue. First, courts and practitioners need to be alert to immigration 
status and its role in proceedings. While immigration status often will be argued openly, such 
issues and the family power dynamics that accompany them may not be obvious at first glance. 
Courts must develop sensitivity and awareness to these issues, together with a willingness to engage 
in them thoughtfully. 
Second, recall that immigrants, documented or not, are not total strangers to the 
Constitution. Especially when fundamental rights such as rights arising from the parent-child 
relationship are at stake, courts need to consider skeptically the constitutionality of arguments 
asserting the relevance of immigration status. Rather than sweep issues under the table, courts must 
acknowledge and explore the civil rights implications of immigration status related arguments. 
Third, decision-makers need to resist the dominant narrative regarding immigrants and 
sweeping negative assumptions based on stereotypes. The documented and undocumented 
immigrant population is large and incredibly diverse. The facts in individual cases frequently will 
contradict the broader societal narrative. 
Fourth, if immigration law is relevant to the outcome of a family law matter in any way, 
great care must be taken to see that relevant immigration law and its implications are understood. 
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This is the task not just of the court, but of attorneys practicing in family courts as well. 158 Just as 
criminal defense attorneys are learning that they must have knowledge of immigration law to 
adequately advise their clients, so too will family law attorneys. Professional responsibility may 
require that a family court attorney in a particular matter learn about a client's immigration situation 
to serve that client competently. 
Finally, the tension between immigration law and family runs deep. At a fundamental 
level, the immigration and family laws have conflicting goals and prioritize contradictory policies. 
These differences must be examined as part of any meaningful debate about immigration reform. 
The intersection of family law and immigration law is a place from which basic tenets of both may 
be examined and challenged. 
Much more exploration of the overlooked role that immigration status frequently plays in 
family law matters is needed. The family courts are an important institution and will playa key role 
in the lives of many immigrant children and families. Whether this role is positive will in large part 
be determined by how family courts respond to the challenges that immigrant families present. 
158. Some materials designed specifically to explain relevant immigration law to family court judges are beginning to 
become available. See KATHERINE BRADY & SALLY KINOSHITA, IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK fOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY 
COURT COURTS (ILRC Publications 2003). 
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